Issues such as genetic engineering and vaccinations evoke strong, contrasting attitudes in society. But what influences our attitude towards such scientific topics? Does more education automatically ensure that people have a more positive attitude towards science? A new study shows that attitudes toward science are less about what a person knows and more about what they think they know. Accordingly, people with strong opinions on topics such as genetic engineering or vaccinations believe that they are well versed in the relevant areas. In the case of people with strongly negative attitudes, however, this self-assessment does not correspond to their objective knowledge.
Whether it’s vaccines, climate change or genetically modified foods, socially important science can generate strong and conflicting attitudes. Previous studies have shown that people who know little about the scientific facts and background often have a particularly negative attitude. In science communication, it was therefore long assumed that simply imparting more knowledge would be a helpful strategy for greater acceptance. However, more recent studies call this into question. It has been shown that people who reject vaccinations or genetic engineering, for example, do not have the feeling that they know too little about these topics. In contrast, they often believe that they are particularly well informed.
Strong conviction, strong belief in one’s own knowledge
A team led by Cristina Fonseca from the Genetics Society in London has now looked at how the discrepancy between objective and subjective knowledge of a scientific topic is related to attitudes. Fonesca and her colleagues asked more than 2,000 people in Great Britain about their attitude towards genetic engineering. Among other things, the subjects were asked to indicate whether they considered claims about the benefits of modern genetic research to be exaggerated and whether they believed that those responsible could be trusted.
In addition, the researchers surveyed how high the respondents rated their knowledge on this topic. With twelve knowledge questions, they also tested how well the subjects actually knew their way around. “We found that people with more extreme attitudes, either positive or negative, are more likely to believe they understand genetics,” the researchers report. Psychologically, the team says, this makes sense: in order to hold a strong opinion, one must firmly believe in the accuracy of one’s understanding of the basic facts.
Unjustified self-confidence
For people with a positive attitude towards science in relation to genetic engineering, the knowledge questions showed that they were generally well versed in the field. However, this was different for the people who had a negative attitude and were convinced that they had a high level of factual knowledge on the subject: it was found that they were wrong on many knowledge questions – for example the question of whether only genetically modified tomatoes had genes contained or whether one’s own DNA could be altered through the consumption of genetically modified foods.
“We find that those who report negative attitudes are mistaken in their belief that they understand science,” the researchers said. “This can be observed both with and without reference to specific gene technologies. So, for some, rejection of specific technologies may be a cloak hiding an underlying negativity underpinned by unwarranted self-confidence.” turned, replicate.
Replace what you feel with real knowledge
This finding has important implications for science communication: instead of simply conveying information from research, a better strategy might be to close the gaps between what people know and what they think they know. “To overcome some people’s negative attitudes toward science, you probably have to deconstruct what they think they know about science and replace it with a more accurate understanding,” says co-author Anne Ferguson-Smith of Cambridge University. “It’s quite a challenge.”
Source: Cristina Fonseca (The Genetics Society, London) et al., PLoS Biology, doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3001915