Institutionalized, clandestine “reconnaissance”: A historian examines how the modern concept of military intelligence evolved. Verena Moritz from the University of Vienna dealt primarily with the secret service of the Habsburg monarchy, which came into being in the middle of the 19th century. As she found out, this so-called evidence bureau was more developed earlier than previously thought.
It is a well-known fact that those in power want to know what their competitors and enemies are up to – that has probably always been the case. Secret service activities are therefore already known from antiquity. But they were not based on institutional structures like the modern versions. For millennia, intelligence activities tended to be missions on specific issues and conflicts. For this purpose, reconnaissance units were formed and then disbanded again.
A clear further development of the concept called “intelligence” in the research only came in the course of the Napoleonic Wars and in the further course of the 19th century. “The 19th century changed an incredible amount socially and politically,” says Moritz. Nation states with general conscription were formed, there were advances in technology and, for the first time, a mass press. In the course of this change, the secret service systems also changed, explains the historian.
On the trail of secret systems
For a long time, the prevailing opinion in intelligence research was that the decisive thrusts towards professionalization only occurred in the decade before the First World War. But this assumption seems questionable in view of the secretive nature of the subject. “The development of modern intelligence is very underexposed in research,” says Moritz. A lot is known about the Russian, French and German secret services. But this is not the case with a “pioneer state” of the concept: With the Records Bureau of the Habsburg monarchy, the first permanent military secret service was created in the middle of the 19th century. “Austria-Hungary forms one of the biggest gaps in intelligence research. That’s where my research comes in,” says the historian.
As Moritz explains, the reason for setting up the Evidenzbureau was the conflict with Prussia for supremacy in the German Confederation. The task of this early institutional secret service was the systematic collection and evaluation of information that was made available to the military general staff. Apparently, the work of the Evidenzbureau was not as exciting as one might think. It was a “pretty boring job,” says Moritz. Espionage – spying on rivals – already existed, but it was by no means the central task, says the historian. The main part of the work was information processing, for example in the form of cartographic evaluations.
As Moritz further reports, there were major changes at the registry office in the course of the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. During this time, the area of conflict shifted to the Balkans and conflicts with Russia arose. In order to clarify possible threats at the borders, the customer service was expanded institutionally and in terms of personnel, especially in the 1880s. Civilian institutions began to be involved – first the border guards, but later also customs and the gendarmerie, reports Moritz. “This is one finding that I was able to work out very centrally as part of the project: Contrary to what was previously thought, this integration did not start in the decade before the First World War, but earlier,” says Moritz.
About change, spies and motives
The researcher was also able to work out the background to this development: The secret service was therefore unable to meet the growing challenges financially and in terms of personnel. Instead, therefore, cooperation with civil institutions developed. Even if Moritz was able to show that some developments began much earlier than previously thought, it once again became clear that the work of the secret service had reached a new level in the decade before the First World War. Because other countries also expanded their systems and, above all, the number of espionage cases rose sharply.
What was striking was that the Russians had more spies among the kuk officers than vice versa. Moritz was also able to point out two interesting aspects as part of her research: The famous “recruitment” of spies by opposing secret services only played a small role. As it became apparent, the collaborators were usually “self-suppliers”. “These officers were almost never concerned with political motives, but with money,” says Moritz.
“I was surprised by the number of espionage cases that I was able to investigate as part of the project,” reports the historian. However, these were mainly “small fish”, according to Moritz. By far the most spectacular case is and remains that of Colonel Alfred Redl. He had made it to deputy head of the records office. In doing so, he spied on the system for the Russian Tsarist Empire. It was not until 1913 that Redl was exposed and then committed suicide.
Source: Austrian Science Fund FWF